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There is no unique and defi nitive defi nition of phenomenology. It is rather a method and an experience always open and 
always renewing itself. Phenomenology involves a change in the “sense of the world”: everything acquires its sense and 
value only when it becomes the content of the lived experience of the subject correlated to his intentional acts. This is 
the main thesis of the phenomenological method aiming at overcoming the traditional opposition between rationalism 
and empiricism. Starting from Husserl, the father of this approach, the history of phenomenology undertook different 
and unexpected developments which in some cases were rather far away from Husserl’s original thought. In the U.K. 
attention has been given to an analytical-epistemological phenomenology focused on the relationship between inten-
tionality and logical semantics. In France it is mainly an anthropological-existential phenomenology. In Germany an 
hermeneutic phenomenology was developed, mainly by Heidegger and Gadamer.
Regardless of these raw distinctions, a big question is so far unresolved: how to reconcile the phenomenological/
existential stance claiming for the irreducibility of each lived experience and the scientifi c paradigm? Is it possible to 
imagine brain mechanisms and physiological systems explaining the endless mysteries and manifold paradoxes of the 
human being?
Phenomenology claims that a human being can never be considered as an object, as if he was a natural thing; rather 
the task is to understand him as the focus of a relationship linking subjective attitudes to the objects showed by the ex-
perience. In this sense, an important contribution was Merleau-Ponty’s view that man is not something psychic joined 
to an organism, but a sort of fl uctuation of the existence that sometimes is a bodily one, sometimes refers to personal 
acts. Consequently, he proposes to reinstate in the existence both its “physiological” and “psychic” sides both being 
intentionally oriented towards a world.
Keywords: intentionality, lived experience, lifeworld, opacity of the sensible world, bodily perception.
DIAL PHIL MENT NEURO SCI 2014; 7(2): 50-62
50
What is phenomenology? A unique and fi nal 
defi nition of phenomenology is dangerous and 
perhaps even paradoxical as it lacks a thematic 
focus. In fact, it is not a doctrine, nor a philo-
sophical school, but rather a style of thought, a 
method, an open and ever-renewed experience 
having different results, and this may disorient 
anyone wishing to defi ne the meaning of phe-
nomenology. It seems that asking this question 
ends up betraying its unquestionable innova-
tive capacity, because in a question like “what 
is phenomenology?” it is implicitly assumed the 
existence of a judging subject remaining outside 
and separated from the object of investigation. 
On the opposite one of the fi rst assumptions of 
phenomenology is that subject and object are 
linked by an inseparable and original relation-
ship, in the sense that there can be no world 
without a subject, nor the subject without world. 
In phenomenology the term “subject” is not in-
tended as a category of thought, as the Cartesian 
Cogito, but as a person living in an inseparable 
relationship with the world, the body and other 
real people.
Phenomenology implies a parallel refl ection 
on the meaning of things and of human life. It 
involves a change in the “sense of the world”: 
everything, even if it preserves objectivity, ac-
quires meaning and value only when it becomes 
the content of the lived experience of the subject 
in the correlation of its intentional acts.
It is a complex program excluding answers 
pretending to be univocal in principle; a program 
infl uencing many fi elds of knowledge, from 
epistemology to ethics, aesthetics, anthropology, 
religion and psychiatry/psychology.
Perhaps for this reason, the term has now en-
tered the common language, everybody talks 
about phenomenology, but excludes the fact that 
there are as many phenomenologies as authors 
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confronting with it; even Husserl conceived dif-
ferent phases of his thought giving birth to dif-
ferent traditions of researches, depending on the 
themes discussed and the period of Husserl’s 
thought to which they refer.
All this constitutes a hard problem in defi n-
ing phenomenology; Husserl himself found 
diffi cult to recognize himself in a fi nished and 
printed work because his thought developed as 
a work in progress during all his life, through 
writing, research and description. Hence the dif-
fi culty for students, because Husserl’s focusing 
on phenomenological themes cannot be reduced 
to single writings and does not follow a strict 
chronological order.
It is well known that the fi rst period of study 
of Husserl was characterized by a strong inter-
est in mathematics and by the attempt to give a 
psychological foundation to the eternal truth of 
the numbers.
Then his interest turns to philosophical stud-
ies and takes decisive impetus from the de-
scriptive psychology by Brentano (1874/2009) 
and from his research about psychic origins of 
logical processes.a Following rational criteria, 
Brentano’s intent was to draw a classifi cation of 
psychic phenomena, a kind of pure morphology 
of the experiences and of their forms of rela-
tionship. Having recognized the intentional arc 
in referring to objects, Brentano distinguished 
between the perceived object and the object as 
it is perceived by us; it follows that subjectiv-
ity can take on different attitudes regarding the 
same object.
Brentano had much infl uence on Husserl’s 
thought, who was looking for a “subjective” 
foundation of knowledge. The same important 
role had the works by Bernhard Bolzano espe-
cially talking about his intuition to distinguish 
the ideal character of the meanings from the 
nature of psychological and actual experiences 
in which they become accessible to each of us. 
The work by Bolzano cannot be considered as 
completed or fi nal. In the Logical Investigations 
(1900/2001) Husserl argues that in Bolzano’s 
research there is a lack of a philosophical evalu-
ation of the logical discipline itself. Bolzano 
correctly traces the distinction between propo-
sitions/assertions and judgments: judgments are 
psychological events always referring to a sub-
jectivity, while propositions are logical entities 
not implying a subjectivity thinking about them. 
There is therefore a different ontological status 
between object and meaning. However, Bolzano 
leaves unsolved some questions Husserl will at-
tempt to answer in the Logical Investigations:
“How are we to understand the fact that the intrinsic 
being of objectivity becomes ‘presented’, ‘appre-
hended’ in knowledge, and so ends up by becoming 
subjective? What does it mean to say that the object 
has ‘being-in-itself’, and is ‘given’ in knowledge? 
How can the ideality of the universal […] enter the 
fl ux of real mental states and becoming an epis-
temic possession of the thinking person?” (Husserl, 
1900/2001, p.169)
Starting from the Logical Investigations, Hus-
serl wants to bring the concepts to the insights 
from which they originated in order to restore 
the relationship between symbol (the conceptual 
level) on one side, and the world of intuition on 
the other. The way science itself proceeds be-
comes enigmatic if bounds linking concept and 
intuition are lost. However, the reference to the 
experience does not mean a return to introspec-
tive research, but to the way the thing itself is 
given.
In this perspective Husserl goes beyond Bren-
tano’s position, whose schema was act  object, 
and introduces the notion of noema (sense, mean-
ing), and consequently the pattern becomes:
actnoema (sense, meaning)  object.
This means that every intentional act is related 
to a sense (noema) through which we go toward 
the object. Noema is not the object itself, but 
rather the way in which the object is experienced 
and in which is manifested in the experience.
The two volumes of the Logical Investiga-
tions (Husserl, 1900/2001, 1901/2001) are the 
real foundation stone of the new phenomenolog-
ical program that was supposed to transform the 
philosophy into a “rigorous science” and, at the 
same time, bring the positive sciences out from 
the crisis in which they found themselves.
Husserl’s phenomenology is a return to the 
original sources of intuition and the discovery 
of the essences; its aim is to establish the pos-
sibility of rigorous scientifi c researches. Husserl 
tries to free propositions and logical laws from 
the relativistic and conventionalist interpretation 
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of natural laws. The phenomenological inquiry 
aims to be a theory of knowledge based on in-
tuition, and intuition is not only intuition of the 
object as it is concretely given in perception, but 
also of abstract “general objects”.
For Husserl an inquiry only makes sense as it 
has an intentional basis, and the intentional anal-
ysis begins with phenomenology which relates 
to the experience.
The subjective premise of the theory of knowl-
edge of logical truths is the intuitive act; while 
the objective premise is the essence intended as 
the content of intuition. This pure phenomenol-
ogy, on the one hand, is useful to psychology as 
an empirical science because it studies in terms 
of general essences those experiences that psy-
chology investigates empirically; on the other 
hand, phenomenology as a theory of knowledge 
reveals the sources from which the fundamental 
concepts and ideal laws of pure logic derive.
Facing the limits of scientifi c knowledge, 
viewed from a naturalistic and objective point of 
view, Husserl claims the idea of a rigorous sci-
ence that allows to understand the cognitive phe-
nomenon in all its complexity, bringing it back 
to its subjective sources. The intent of Husserl 
was to recover the original and “pre-refl ective” 
sphere from which scientifi c knowledge derives; 
he wanted to rediscover which was the origin of 
those concepts and categories that science uses 
without questioning them and without subject-
ing them to critical analysis; his intent was to 
free knowledge from false problems created by 
our habits of thought and language.
This is the meaning of the famous motto we 
must go back to the ‘things themselves’ (Husserl, 
1900/2001, p.168)  from which the phenomeno-
logical program starts.
Husserl wanted to free philosophy from those 
(empiricists, positivists, subjectivists, psycholo-
gists) who more or less consciously based knowl-
edge in the relationship between the ego and an 
external and transcendent reality. The phenom-
enology, based on the intentional point of view, 
considers an absurdity the theoretical assump-
tion that the self and the objective world should 
enter into a relationship only in the cognitive act.
They are already existing as ego and as objec-
tive reality even before entering into this rela-
tionship. The concept of Erlebnis - lived expe-
rience - becomes central: it is only within this 
lived experience that the distinction between 
consciousness and its object arises.
In Volume II of the Logical Investigations 
Husserl aims to lay the foundations for the 
knowledge of ideal objectivities and to rebuild 
psychology on different bases. This is the tran-
scendental turning point that many suspicions 
aroused in his closest collaborators: Heidegger, 
Scheler, and Patocka were critical of a phenom-
enology transforming itself from descriptive 
psychology to “transcendental” phenomenology. 
Merleau-Ponty had a different view of this turn-
ing point:
“we must - precisely in order to see the world and 
grasp it as a paradox - rupture our familiarity with 
it, and this rupture can teach us nothing except the 
unmotivated springing forth of the world. The most 
important lesson of the reduction is the impossibil-
ity of a complete reduction. This is why Husserl 
always wonders anew about the possibility of the 
reduction. [It is such because he understands that] 
philosophy itself must not take itself as established 
in the truths it has managed to utter, that philosophy 
is an ever-renewed experiment of its own beginning, 
that it consists entirely in describing this beginning, 
and fi nally, that radical refl ection is conscious of its 
own dependence on an unrefl ected life that is its ini-
tial, constant, and fi nal situation” (Merleau-Ponty, 
1945/2013, pp.lxxvii-lxxviii)
A signifi cant encounter is that between Hus-
serl and Heidegger, who will be his assistant and 
friend until the advent of Nazism, when their 
paths defi nitely diverged.b In this period Hus-
serl’s phenomenological ideas fully developed, 
and some of his most important works were pub-
lished: Philosophy as rigorous science (Husserl, 
1910/1965), Ideas for a pure phenomenology 
and phenomenological philosophy (1913/2014), 
and Cartesian meditations (1931/1982). This pe-
riod ends with the writing on Formal and tran-
scendental logic (Husserl, 1929/1977).
A third period is marked by the publication 
of The crisis of European sciences, written be-
tween 1935-1937, but published posthumously 
in 1954 (Husserl, 1954/1970); this work has 
been a source of great interest in psychoanaly-
sis. In this work Husserl clarifi es the meaning of 
his research that oscillates between two poles: 
a negative and critical moment considering that 
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science has no sense for human existence as it is 
animated only by a naturalistic attitude focused 
only on factual data without meaning; and a 
positive moment which coincides with the phe-
nomenological method designed to recover the 
idea of a more authentic philosophy looking for 
a fundamental basis.
The crisis, denounced by Husserl, becomes 
more serious in relation to the sciences of the 
spirit and in primis to the psychology that bor-
rowing the same method from natural sciences 
reduces man to an object of experimentation and 
scientifi c analysis. The paradox lies in want-
ing to treat the human being along the lines of 
things, ignoring the reality of the experience.
There is no space to analyze in detail the vari-
ous evolutionary stages of Husserl’s thought, so 
we limit ourselves to point out some basic ideas 
of the phenomenological method proposed by 
Husserl: epochè, intentionality, phenomenon, 
experience, noema, noesis, the lifeworld, eidetic 
reduction, the transcendental ego.
EPOCHÈ AND INTENTIONALITY
From the etymological point of view, phe-
nomenology is the study of phenomena that 
present themselves to consciousness, or as Hus-
serl himself confi rms, it is a “philosophy based 
on experience”, understood as the manifestation 
of the things themselves in their full evidence. It 
aims to explore the way phenomena appear and 
therefore the relations between what appears and 
the one to whom something appears, abstracting 
from any form of acquired knowledge.
The phenomena dealt with by the phenom-
enology are not data, they are not facts, they are 
not mere abstractions, but they always have their 
reference to a subjective pole and that is why 
they are always signifi cant.
A phenomenology of perception must there-
fore put in brackets scientifi c, cultural and philo-
sophical prejudices burdened with historically 
constructed conceptions (causalism, physiol-
ogy, mind/body dualism) and try fi rst to simply 
describe the lived experience (Erlebnis) of per-
ception. Hence Husserl’s appeal to go back to 
reality purifi ed of all conceptual superstructure. 
However, this return to the things themselves, 
to the way they concretely give themselves, is 
not to be intended as a return to empiricism, to 
Hume’s principle esse est percipi; in Husserl’s 
opinion this was a failed attempt. Even today we 
still wonder if the world really is as we directly 
experience it; it is on such a skeptical outcome 
that the phenomenologist needs to refl ect.
On the other hand the very fact that phenom-
enology criticizes empiricism does not allow to 
conclude that it shall be considered as a repeti-
tion in new clothes of the philosophy of Des-
cartes or Kant. Husserl declares great admiration 
for the radical approach followed by Descartes 
with his methodical doubt; in fact, by suspend-
ing the obviousness of the world as we already 
know it, Descartes seemed to anticipate the phe-
nomenological description. However, Husserl 
reproaches Descartes for the fi nal outcome of 
his philosophy: the certainty of the cogito and 
consequently of the deductive procedure.
Even Kant, the philosopher of subjectivity, 
has not been able to conceive as a consequence 
of his theory a descriptive philosophy able to 
show how to form a world from the experience 
we have. The philosophical design of Kant is 
reduced to a mere indication of those a-priori 
categories assumed in the intellect and applied 
to the experience.
The phenomenological method of Husserl 
intends to overcome both positions and to free 
itself from the traditional opposition between 
empiricism and rationalism. In Husserl’s opin-
ion, phenomenology is a descriptive science of 
intentional phenomena based on an inseparable 
relationship between subjective and objective 
poles. The object of the intentional act is not 
separable from the act that establishes it.
In other words, a sound which is heard al-
ways presupposes an act of hearing, and the lat-
ter is ignored if the analysis focuses only on the 
heard sound.
This method requires a preliminary act of ep-
ochè, conceived as the suspension of the trust 
placed in naturalistic beliefs regarding both the 
certainty of science and the objectivity of the 
world; for Husserl such beliefs are prejudices 
that distort the true understanding of the world.
With the epochè Husserl poses his work in 
the horizon of critical philosophy; in this con-
text the phenomenon is no more an individual 
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and contingent fact, either historical or empiri-
cal, but it is observed, looked at and described in 
its essential sense.
The epochè is a methodic premise and a pro-
grammatic meta-discourse on phenomenology; 
it is a sort of operation through which you cannot 
see the world as an independent entity (cfr. Costa 
et al., 2002, p.127).
After having suspended his belief in the cer-
tainty of science and objectivity of the world, 
the phenomenologist manages to discover phe-
nomena in their pure givenness to consciousness 
and in their absolute evidence; from here he goes 
back to the pre-categorical and pre-refl exive ex-
perience conceived as the original dimension in 
which the world, in the way it gives itself, “ap-
pears” to the consciousness.
The epochè is never completed; it is a tool 
starting to work whenever new thematic hori-
zons are disclosed to the intentional constitution.
What remains after applying the epochè is not 
a metaphysical and “productive” subject from 
which the existence of things would depend, but 
a consciousness understood as a “relationship”, 
the inseparable connection between subject and 
object.
It is good to clarify that for “consciousness” 
Husserl means an operating principle, a set of 
acts directed to the object. The object gradually 
shows itself, with all its different levels of mean-
ing. Husserl calls this feature of consciousness 
“intentionality”: it is the most original and inno-
vative concept of the phenomenological method. 
The intentionality allows to overcome the ratio-
nal model which gives primacy to abstract and 
calculating reason, with its mathematical and 
classifying stance, hence excluding the subjec-
tive dimension from scientifi c knowledge. On 
the opposite phenomenological intentionality 
gives priority to the relationship between man 
and his world; it works on the relation of phe-
nomena to humans based on the assumption that 
the world is meaningful for human beings, and 
this cannot be dealt with by reductionist studies. 
The reading of intentionality proposed by Hus-
serl is both “a means to give back to the expe-
rience in general an objective meaning and to 
the experiencing an authentic subjectivity” (cfr. 
Costa et al., 2002, p.105).
Husserl’s theory of intentionality is a concep-
tual tool to conceal the language of a philosophy 
of experience and the everyday language. This 
allows us to say that we see the very same object 
that we are touching, that is an identical object 
that at the same time we see and someone else 
talks about.
The intentionality, according to which con-
sciousness is always consciousness of some-
thing, does not exclude the objective dimension, 
but we can talk of objectivity only within the 
limits of our experience.
Husserl speaks of noema and this term refers 
neither to a mental object (a psychological expe-
rience among others) nor to a real object. Hus-
serl means instead the intentional object as such: 
the object intended exactly as it is intended, and 
within the limits of such intention.
The intentional consciousness is a stream of 
lived experiences in which there is always a cor-
relation between a subjective polarity and an 
objective one. The former, referring to the acts 
of consciousness, is called “noesis”, while the 
latter, the “noema”, refers to the various modali-
ties things present themselves in relation to the 
intentional acts of the subject.
The natural attitude and the common sense 
forgot that if there are objects to be known and 
loved, it is because there is a person who knows 
and loves. The real problem of Husserl is the liv-
ing sense of things, existing for man as they “ap-
pear”.
Intentionality is a pre-categorical dimension, 
prior to each abstract separation of subject and 
object; it only allows us to understand the pro-
cess by which meanings and values, normally 
assumed naively and uncritically, are formed. 
These sense and signifi cance are never com-
pleted, because there are infi nite intentional mo-
dalities by which the subject relates to objects. 
Husserl speaks of a progressive appearance of 
objects, the origin being the lived experience 
(i.e. the intentional modality) and not the sepa-
rated existence of two opposing entities. Starting 
from perception, the phenomenologist describes 
multiple layers and directions of meaning.
In Ideas II (Husserl, 1952/1989) and Ideas 
III (Husserl, 1952/1980) Husserl analyses “log-
ics” understood as a theory of science; a phe-
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nomenological analysis of logics, traditionally 
considered as formal logics, necessarily refers to 
the transcendental logics. The fi rst is the foun-
dation or the method of other sciences, but this 
foundation in the phenomenological perspec-
tive demands in turn to be established: this is the 
task of transcendental logics that wants to be the 
ultimate foundation, a new ground science that 
does not allow anything else as its premise, as 
something previously valid. Formal logics was 
wrongly presented as something pre-established 
and accepted without discussion and without 
justifi cation. The phenomenology with his criti-
cal and transcendental analysis rejects this preju-
dice: logics requires a foundation and justifi ca-
tion too.
The naivety of formal logics, unable to make 
a fi nal understanding and justifi cation of itself, 
is refl ected in the sciences that draw from it the 
formal principles and therefore do not know how 
to grasp the real signifi cance of their fi eld of 
study and key concepts. Husserl takes position 
concerning the dispute between logicism and 
psychologism: on the one hand, we fi nd Mill’s 
and others’ psychologism, according to which 
the rules of logics stem from psychological pro-
cesses; on the other hand we fi nd the logicism 
by Frege and Russell. They claim the absolute 
autonomy of logic from psychology and the hu-
man experience in general. Rejecting both posi-
tions Husserl outlines a completely new point of 
view: logical laws have their basis in experience, 
but in the experience under investigation by the 
transcendental phenomenology and not from 
empirical psychology.
Also the subject is something that requires 
a process of constitution: from the mere logi-
cal function of the ego - the pure ego – to the 
understanding of the subject as “psychological 
and bodily ego” in relation to other bodily egos 
similar to it.
Husserl thus comes to defi ne phenomenology 
as an “eidetic” science in the sense of a descrip-
tive science of essences. It starts with the experi-
ence of things, which are “at hand”, here and now 
for me; the considered world is that constantly 
available, to which I belong and in which things 
present themselves as objects of use. But when 
they bring to my consciousness, when I put in 
brackets the usual and pre-established meaning, 
i.e. when I use the phenomenological epochè and 
operate the “eidetic reduction” of the world, here 
I can grasp the essence of things: that is I replace 
the perception of the particular facts with the vi-
sion or intuition of general forms. For example, 
listening to the sounds of different instruments, 
my consciousness captures at the same time the 
sound of an instrument and also its “essence of 
sound”.
This knowledge of the essence of things is 
what Husserl calls “eidetic intuition”, which 
takes place not by abstraction or comparison of 
similar things, as erroneously believed the em-
piricists, but by a direct intuition of what is uni-
versal.
This is the real project of re-foundation of 
knowledge and culture sponsored by the phe-
nomenology of Husserl: the key point is to high-
light a level of “original evidence”, universal 
and valid for all, which is the basis of any further 
scientifi c construction.
The phenomenology offers the opportunity to 
begin again, to “go and see” how things in the 
world are in their multiple levels of existence 
and of showing their essential structures. This 
process rediscovers the subjective roots offering 
to western man the opportunity to regain a sense 
that he had lost, because the calculating, natural-
istic and objectivist reason had totally neglected 
it.
The fi rst result of the phenomenological 
method is therefore to restore the foundation of 
knowledge to man and to his knowledge.
The next step will lead Husserl to the discov-
ery of the “lifeworld” (Lebenswelt), the world 
that we experience before and independently 
from the categories and concepts of science.
THE LIFEWORLD
The lifeworld is a concept that Husserl intro-
duces in the last years, also to escape the criti-
cism about the transcendental subject, aroused 
especially by his closest collaborators.
Husserl makes it clear that the subject reveals 
itself originally as a “concrete subject” which 
is constituted in the intentional relationship as 
“own body”, always in relation to other bodies 
that he feels as similar.
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The lifeworld coincides with the intersubjec-
tive dimension as it gives itself in its “pre- and 
extra-scientifi c” immediacy. It is the central 
theme of the last work by Husserl: The Crisis 
of European Sciences, which is a complex work 
containing a number of conferences that Hus-
serl held in Vienna and Prague in 1935 (three 
years before his death in 1938). Published post-
humously by Eugen Fink, according to some 
critics was written as Husserl’s “answer” to Hei-
degger’s Being and Time.
The Crisis, one of the most interesting works 
of the entire philosophical landscape of the 
twentieth century, is a fi erce critic to the irratio-
nalism and the philosophical relativism, as well 
as a critique to scientifi c rationality.
This is not a dogmatic rejection of science, but 
rather a way to take away from the idea of sci-
ence advocated by positivism.
The crisis denounced by Husserl is not about 
the practical outcomes of science, since their 
success is undeniable, but rather about its mean-
ing for human existence: science, making a re-
duction of reality to the physical-mathematical 
parameters only, forgot the “lifeworld”, i.e. the 
needs, emotions and purposes of the people. This 
is also, paradoxically, for those sciences such as 
psychology, anthropology, history that reduce 
man to an “object” of investigation in order to 
study him in a neutral manner and from the out-
side, making it an object of experimentation and 
analysis.
The scientifi c stance privileged the physical-
mathematical disciplines and ruled out all the 
aspects that were not covered by formal and 
rigid structures; in doing so, it determined the 
separation between “physical” and “mental” and 
helped to superimpose a world of abstract ideal-
izations to the concrete reality of the lived expe-
rience.
The Crisis is an essential document for under-
standing the complete meaning of the research 
made by Husserl and his desire to rediscover the 
lost sense of things related to subjectivity. His 
rigorous method aims to analyze the fundamen-
tal premises of any knowledge, rooted in the 
lived experience, which is where any meaning 
and any verifi cation of existence and reality take 
place.
The relationship ego - world is here at stake. 
Husserl claims that all these problems derive 
from the ingenuity of science considering the 
objective world as what is real, while it neglects 
that is the subjectivity that makes science pos-
sible.
The lifeworld is clearly distinct from the natu-
ral world.
The phenomenology proceeds by clarifying 
in order to enter the realm of “pure and direct 
givenness”. Husserl taught us to work critically 
on the thought to indicate with the greatest clar-
ity some ideas able to unravel the processes of 
knowledge.
In Husserl’s opinion it is only phenomenology 
that can consider the reciprocal implication of 
the streams of life of individual subjects. What is 
considered external in the ingenuous positivity 
or in the objectifi cation becomes an intentional 
implication if seen from within.
The lifeworld is a motivational horizon for all 
subjects in their active-passive “wholeness”. In 
other words, the lifeworld is a natural world that 
becomes motivational horizon for us, the inter-
subjective horizon where any sense is conferred. 
This lifeworld is accessed through a process that 
goes through the constitution of intersubjectiv-
ity. Even in this case would be limiting to “de-
fi ne” the lifeworld because it is a “horizon of 
thematization” in active and passive action; it 
is the clarifi cation of the role of pre-categorical 
and passive synthesis. The lifeworld is a mean-
ing that is given, which always acts; and this dis-
closure of meaning is an intentional process in 
which this world is for me.
Starting from the question of intersubjectivity, 
Husserl discovers that the world surrounding me, 
the world-for-us, is not an abstract philosophi-
cal problem. Rather, it is a web of structures of 
meaning that is grasped by the experience.
The subject can be motivated only by what he 
‘lives’, by what is present in his consciousness, 
by what is given to him as real, certain, valid, 
good, etc. (cfr. Costa et al., 2002, p.207)
The Crisis is Husserl’s fi nal effort to include 
his work in a historical, theoretical and teleolog-
ical project in which the lifeworld is a ground 
search for “intentional a-priori and pure psy-
chology”, able to study the basic problems of 
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knowledge.
In fact for Husserl intentional psychology, in-
tersubjectivity, transcendental and constitutive 
phenomenology are not separate horizons, but 
parts of the same research of the original, of the 
pre-categorical lifeworld in which the operations 
of meaning are rooted.
Husserl’s phenomenology is properly a theo-
ry, that is a “vision” which means, in the fi rst 
instance, to gain awareness, to make understand-
able and evident what are, in their general es-
sence, thought and knowledge” (cfr. Costa et al., 
2002, p.131).
In rejecting a psychologistic conception of 
the experience, Husserl took distance from the 
empiricist language in order: a) to give back to 
perception its direct and immediate access to 
the world of objects, and b) to distinguish more 
clearly what depends on attitudes and orienta-
tions of the knowing subject and what instead on 
the objects that present themselves in the experi-
ence.
The task of phenomenology is to scientifi cally 
investigate the way in which the lifeworld serves 
as a foundation of the scientifi c logical and theo-
retical truths. In other words, the world of sci-
ence is a logical/theoretical construction which 
is based on the lifeworld as its premise. The life-
world, which is constantly “already given” and 
originally evident, is the basis from where the 
logical/objective evidence of mathematics can 
arise.
This science of the lifeworld is the recovery 
of the original meaning of the intentionality, sub-
jective and intersubjective. It represents an effort 
by Husserl, sometimes desperate, to understand 
once again the general meaning of his work. 
This always tries to fi nd, in the description of the 
lifeworld, the foundation of the “vital” root of all 
our knowledge.
One thing whatsoever, even if it occurs un-
changed in perception, it is always something 
extremely multi-faceted, which refers to the 
multiplicity of different points of view of the ego 
and its related operations. 
Therefore, next to the ingenious and methodi-
cal work of the special sciences, it is necessary 
to Husserl a continuous critical refl ection about 
knowledge; and this solely pertains to the phe-
nomenologist who must grasp the essential 
meaning of the general categories under which 
proceeds scientifi c research. He must also de-
scribe the relationship between these essences 
and the acts of knowledge: everything in order 
to understand what the “science theory” is and 
what makes it possible.
The history of phenomenology is far from 
being over: it continues to ask questions about 
“how things and the world are given”.
To summarize briefl y, we can say that Hus-
serl assigns a new task to phenomenology that is 
to awaken in the individual and the humanity a 
sense of the regained centrality of human subjec-
tivity as source of all value and meaning. Before 
and beyond the scientifi c categories there is the 
lifeworld, the world as we experience it before 
and independently from the categories and con-
cepts of science.  The physical and formal sci-
ences distanced themselves from the horizon of 
human and subjective experience, they superim-
posed a grid of concepts and formal structures 
to the true essence of the world and experience, 




Starting with the phenomenology of Husserl 
several researches developed, offering a new 
way of dealing with the problems that equally in-
volve science and philosophy, this is a new way 
to rethink the foundations, the basic questions 
directly concerning the nature of their methods 
and objects. The phenomenological method is-
sued metaphysics, referential logics, epistemol-
ogy, philosophy of mind, philosophical anthro-
pology and psychoanalysis.
There is thus an analytical-epistemological 
phenomenology which explores the intellectual 
experience in relationships to the lived experi-
ences in which our thoughts are constituted; it 
works on the relationship between intentionality 
and logical semantics.
In an opposite direction works the anthropo-
logical-existential phenomenology, spreading 
mainly in French culture and having its greatest 
exponents in the early Heidegger, Levinas, Sar-
tre and Merleau-Ponty. The role played by her-
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meneutic phenomenology is no less interesting; 
it was drew mainly by Heidegger, Gadamer and 
Ricoeur. The phenomenological method found 
many application fi elds: theology, thanks to 
works by Edith Stein who, among other things, 
worked on empathy as an intentional form of 
“perception by analogy”; ethics, aesthetics, psy-
chiatry and psychoanalysis. It also generated a 
huge interest in brilliant thinkers from USA and 
Japan.
The original receiving of phenomenology by 
the French culture is still very much alive: it is 
indicated as anthropological-existential phenom-
enology, which moves within a phenomenology 
of facticity oriented in the existential sense.
French people read Husserl together with the 
work by Heidegger Sein und Zeit (1927). Such 
phenomenological infl uences arrive in a theoret-
ical landscape dominated by metaphysical ten-
dencies and also open to Freudian and Lacanian 
suggestions.
French scholars take from Heidegger his at-
tention to man considered as existence, being in 
the world, Da-sein. In Heidegger’s philosophy 
man is thrown into the world in a given situa-
tion, but he is also a project towards the future, 
possibility, freedom, wait, hope, anguish. While 
the existence of things is mechanical and auto-
matic, man’s existence is not pre-determined, he 
is a being-in the world, understood as existential 
(and not cognitive as in Husserl) relationship be-
tween two concrete realities: a situated and bodi-
ly subject and the world of things and of men. 
This world is not a simple presence, but what has 
meaning in relation to man.
The phenomenology by Heidegger has shown 
that consciousness is not in the head, but the in-
tersection of the body, the world and the others; 
this is a complex and dynamic relationship that 
cannot be reduced to a purely materialistic ex-
planation in terms of neuronal functions.
It remains an open question which is still at 
the center of many debates on the possibility of 
opening a dialogue between phenomenology 
and science: how to reconcile the existentialist 
and phenomenological approach, claiming the 
irreducibility of every experience, with the sci-
entifi c paradigm?
In addition to the infl uence of Heidegger, at the 
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beginning of the twentieth century we can see in 
France a close relationship between philosophy 
and medical psychopathology. As pointed out 
by Elisabeth Roudinesco (1986), there are many 
students of the École Normale who specialize 
in psychopathology, following the teachings of 
G. Dumas, P. Janet, H. Wallon, D. Lagache, J. 
Laplanche.
In 1915 E. Minkowski, the famous Russian 
psychiatrist, took French citizenship and started 
his research on a structural model of the psyche 
both normal and pathological based on Husserl’s 
phenomenology and on the bergsonian distinc-
tion between spatialized time and experienced 
duration. Such research found great acceptance 
in French culture and anticipated studies about 
the Daseinsanalyse made by Binswanger.
Sartre was also particularly sensitive to these 
interests towards psychopathology: when he was 
still a young student at the Sainte-Anne he fol-
lowed on Sundays morning together with Aron, 
Nizan and many of his fellow students the bril-
liant displays of clinical psychopathology of 
G. Dumas. Perhaps inspired by these thoughts, 
he chose to write his diploma of Higher Stud-
ies about Delacroix, a psychologist specialized 
in the study of mystical delirium and as an ar-
gument to be treated, “imagination”, one of the 
most diffi cult psychological and debated issues. 
Later, as a research topic for a scholarship at the 
French Institute in Berlin, he proposed Relations 
between the psychic and the physiological in 
general.
Mental illness runs like a red thread many sto-
ries of The Wall (Sartre, 1939/2010) whose titles 
are based on the clinical observations compiled 
by Dumas in his Nouveau Traité (1923-1924); 
the most peculiar of all is the story entitled The 
Room in which Sartre describes a case of hallu-
cinatory psychosis.
The novel Nausea (Sartre, 1938/2013) 
aroused great interest for the study of psycho-
pathology; here the character Roquentin feels an 
obscure change in his habits and familiar things. 
As observed by E. De Martino (1997, p.133) 
in his review of the Nausea by Sartre, “the ob-
jects manifest themselves to Roquentin suffer-
ing from an internal weakness that will dissolve 
them in a fi ctitious, artifi cial and unreal scenario, 
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overfl owing with terrifying possibility to further 
shipwrecks”.
This analysis is deeply infl uenced by the con-
cept of “primary delusional experiences” intro-
duced in psychopathology by Jaspers. These 
are delusional experiences no further derivable 
through (un-understandable), announcing the 
arising psychosis. The crisis has a sudden onset 
in which the everyday world of usual habits, the 
obvious and the familiar become problematic, 
highlighting an obscure change of meaning that 
arises in a non-avoidable way and yet remains 
seamless (De Martino, 1997, p.141).
De  Martino argues that Sartre himself used 
his knowledge of the Allgemeine Psychopa-
thologie (Jaspers, 1913) which - starting a phe-
nomenological psychopathology - established 
the fundamental distinction between explaining 
something from the outside and understanding 
something from the inside.
De Martino identifi ed Nausea as a specimen 
starting point and, at the same time, a guide and 
a reference point for further analysis. He looks 
at the way the entire diary variously reweaves 
the issue of the collapse of the intraworldly en-
tities, the loss of their everyday obviousness; 
consequently, in its episodes is experienced an 
existential disorientation from what should be 
familiar, although Roquentin still tries to mask 
his “small crisis of madness” by appealing to the 
regular and the household of his daily life (De 
Martino, 1997, p.132).
In Roquentin’s experience the relationship 
with reality is characterized by the fact that ob-
jects become strange, bizarre, weak, free, uncer-
tain, undecided, artifi cial, arbitrary, unnecessary, 
absurd. They are in the act of separating them-
selves from their names and their meaning so as 
to fall within the opaque thickness of a “naked” 
existence without memory of human domestica-
tion. (De Martino, 1997, p.137)
The resistance to face such an existential po-
sition conceals the underlying fear to recognize 
that madness is a permanent possibility against 
which the healthy mind is called again and again 
to fi ght (De Martino, 1997, p.140).
Inspired by Jaspers (1913) numerous studies 
aimed at renewing the status of traditional psy-
chiatry going through a period of crisis.
The proposal of the psychopathology of the 
understanding (verstehende Psychopathologie) 
was to understand from the inside how a psychic 
phenomenon derives from another one; for ex-
ample: the humiliation that produces anger; the 
offense that leads to aggression; the expectation 
that triggers anxiety; a loss that generates depres-
sion. These types of understanding postulate the 
refusal to resort to causal explanations that may 
work for other cases. For example in the case 
of the relationship between alcohol intoxication 
and impaired consciousness; here the causal ex-
planation can be used because the toxic action of 
alcohol on the brain is not a psychic event.
Another great contribution came from 
Binswangerc who went towards a phenomeno-
logical or anthropo-analytical psychiatry; com-
bining psychiatry and philosophy he elaborated 
his Daseinsanalyse inspired by Jaspers’ General 
psychopathology and Heidegger’s Being and 
Time.
Binswanger leads a scientifi c investigation of 
anthropological nature having as its object the 
essence of being human. In this perspective, the 
mentally ill is a human being in his full dignity, 
having his own coherent and comprehensible 
plans even if the character of freedom lacks; 
the mentally ill can no longer be regarded as a 
mere object of scientifi c inquiry because such an 
investigation seems to ignore the intentionality 
characterizing psychic phenomena.
For an authentic renewal of psychiatry the fo-
cus should be put on man and not on the physiol-
ogy of the brain.
Certainly the phenomenologist needs a rigor-
ous description of the characteristics and prop-
erties of individual mental disorders that only 
psychiatry can provide but, unlike the psychia-
trist, he does not use the description itself to con-
struct abstract nosographical concepts, pursuing 
a mechanistic obstinate and classifi catory stance. 
Phenomenology can be of help to psychiatry, 
because it offers the possibility of broader and 
more fruitful research than the strict objectifying 
one.
According to Binswanger the psychopatho-
logical symptom presents itself as a kind of ex-
istential failure, or as a failure to realize the pos-
sibilities of freedom that characterize all human 
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existence.
The attitude of the phenomenologically ori-
ented psychopathologist is to describe the world 
that the patient considers as real, trying to under-
stand things so as the patient sees and lives them; 
hence, he avoids premature judgment.
Sartre approaches phenomenology under the 
infl uence of Jaspers’ ideas; he spent 1933 and 
part of the 1934 in Berlin where he was able to 
get hold of the key concepts of Husserl’s philos-
ophy; the fi rst of all is the idea of intentionality 
interpreted in a personal way, and that he uses to 
deconstruct the substantiality of consciousness 
and to free it from any form of interiority. With-
out intentionality consciousness would have no 
world, but only a disconnected series of sensa-
tions. Sartre (1939/2002, p.383) writes:
“Husserl has restored to things their horror and their 
charm. He has restored to us the world of artists and 
prophets: frightening, hostile, dangerous, with its 
havens of mercy and love. He has cleared the way 
for a new treatise on the passions which would be 
inspired by this simple truth, so utterly ignored by 
the refi ned among us: if we love a woman, it is be-
cause she is loveable”
However, it is good to point out that, although 
infl uenced by Husserl, Sartre has never been nei-
ther a disciple nor an orthodox reader of him.
Many critics and scholars of his thought, as 
V. De Coorebyter (2000), consider that he ap-
proached phenomenology to progress in his 
research, to fi nd material to serve as a starting 
point for his studies, but also that he twisted con-
tinuously phenomenology enough to achieve un-
expected results, perhaps, even away from Hus-
serl’s thought. However, it is noteworthy that 
something similar happened to all those thinkers 
who faced the phenomenological method start-
ing from Husserl.
Sartre thinks that the consciousness exists as 
something other than itself, and that the con-
scious awareness of things is not limited to their 
knowledge: for Sartre intentionality applies to 
the emotions as well as to cognitions, to de-
sires as well as to perceptions. The primacy of 
the logos, of the objective-scientifi c knowledge 
that pretends to judge, classify, measure, and 
compare everything, is no longer valid. In fact, 
before the logos there is life, there are gestures, 
emotions, immediate perceptions, the multiple 
forms of spontaneous life.
The most important work, still today a ref-
erence point for many scholars, it is certainly 
that one dedicated to the imaginary (Sartre, 
1940/2004). Sartre introduces an original idea 
which exceeds and disrupts all the pre-phenome-
nological writings on the image, from Descartes, 
Leibniz and Spinoza to Bergson. For Sartre, the 
image has nothing to do with perception as it re-
fers to the unreal: it is an act and not a thing, it 
has no sensitive content borrowed from the out-
side world and is produced by the free activity 
of consciousness. In his words: “consciousness 
is always ‘in situation’ because it is always free, 
there is always and at every moment the con-
crete possibility for it to produce the irreal” (Sar-
tre, 1940/2004, p.186).
Through the study on the imaginary Sartre 
identifi es the direct link between phenomenol-
ogy and aesthetics, because the imaginary is an 
act of reality denial, just as the work of art where 
what is beautiful cannot be given by perception.
Unlike Sartre who follows Husserl’s ideas 
about the intentionality of consciousness, Mer-
leau-Ponty (1942, 1945/2013) highlights the 
role of perceptual processes and of the relation-
ship between corporeality and lifeworld, thus 
recognizing the priority of the perceiving body, 
of his concrete being in the world independently 
from any abstract bracketing.
Considering the Husserl’s distinction between 
Körper (physical body) and Leib understood as a 
lived body, Merleau-Ponty discovers that there is 
a hidden logos revealed by the perception when 
my body’s intentionality is directed to things. It 
is necessary to reinstate the distinction between 
“physiological” and “psychological” of the ex-
istence because they are both oriented either to-
ward an intentional pole or a world.
As emphasized by Merleau-Ponty in Phenom-
enology of perception:
“Taken concretely, man is not a psyche joined to an 
organism, but rather this back-and-forth of existence 
that sometimes allows itself to exist as a body and 
sometimes carries itself into personal acts. Psycho-
logical motives and bodily events can overlap be-
cause there is no single movement in a living body 
that is an absolute accident with regard to psychical 
intentions and no single psychical act that has not 
found at least its germ or its general outline in physi-
ological dispositions. It is never a question of the 
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incomprehensible encounter of two causalities, nor 
a collision between the order of causes and the order 
of ends” (Merleau-Ponty, 1945/2013, p.90)
Beginning once again the study of perception is 
motivated and justifi ed by different strands in 
Merleau-Ponty’s opinion: the development of 
physiology of the nervous system; the develop-
ment of mental pathology and psychology of the 
child and, especially in Germany, the progress of 
the Gestaltpsychologie.
It is a vast and complex program that cannot 
be analyzed in detail in this work. For this rea-
son few general remarks will follow: fi rst of all, 
that of having laid the foundations for a concrete 
understanding of human subjectivity, such that 
body and mind, nature and consciousness are un-
derstood in an integrated way to overcome their 
division. The adoption of the phenomenological 
method leads Merleau-Ponty to regain the sensi-
tive and earthly sphere of “facticity” as the basis 
of science. So to grasp the behavior of the pa-
tient it is necessary a drastic change of perspec-
tive that leads outside of the mere physiology. In 
order to recover the qualitative dimension and 
the overall signifi cance of the illness, it has to be 
considered as a behavior to understand and not 
just to be explained.
For Merleau-Ponty the bodily perception is 
the core of all knowledge and all relations with 
the surrounding world; in the bodily perception 
the thing is evident to me because I am an em-
bodied consciousness. It is a vital relationship 
with a world environment that does not have the 
crystal clarity of the conceptual meaning, but the 
opacity and ambiguity of the sensible world.
Such emphasis on embodiment leads Merleau-
Ponty to consider very signifi cant the themes of 
sexuality and disease.
Eye and mind, Merleau-Ponty’s (1960) last 
work published before his sudden death is a de-
scription, full of metaphorical references to the 
dynamics of perception, of a being who has his 
roots in the deep common pre-categorical ori-
gins of the body and the world.
In this work, the emphasis is shifted from the 
situated bodily subjectivity as a source of all 
meaning to the “human” being in which the sub-
ject is involved.
CONCLUSIONS
In conclusion, I would like to discuss the 
question that originally oriented my refl ections 
on phenomenological experiences, i.e. how to 
bring together both the phenomenological and 
existential stance at one side and the scientifi c 
paradigm at the other side, considering that the 
former claims that any lived experience, with its 
failures and faulty actions, is irreducible. How is 
it possible to explain the infi nite mystery and the 
paradoxes of human being through brain mecha-
nisms and physiological systems?
The focus here is on man, on his fi nite and 
historical existence, on the sense of existing in 
his own singularity with his angst, suffering and 
needs. This hurdle makes diffi cult and complex 
any dialogue.
In the name of a scientifi c optimism, the be-
ginning of the XXI century sees a naturalistic 
program prevailing and trying to reduce the 
human being either to an animal on top of the 
evolutionary scale or to a complex machine. In 
this context, the recall of the phenomenological 
method may appear paradoxical. However, it 
opens the discussion on an ineludible question: 
converting the human being into a mere object 
of study do we risk neglecting his most proper 
features?
Husserl’s warning is still valid: subjectivity 





a: Brentano is guided by the awareness that our experi-
ences are not objects amid others and therefore cannot be 
found into the soul as things are found in their surrounding 
space. This because consciousness is not the place where 
the experienced contents stand, it is fi rstly “relationship”. 
The critique to the classical theory of introspection had 
to end in the formulation of a theory of experience based 
on the concept of intentionality (cfr, Costa et al., 2002, 
pp.14-17).
b: A rigorous analysis of the changes occurred to the term 
“phenomenology” in Husserl and Heidegger can be found 
in Volpi (1984). 
c: Ludwig Binswanger (1881-1966) was interested in 
medicine, psychiatry, psychoanalysis, philosophy and an-
thropology. He had fruitful discussions with some of the 
greatest fi gures of the time, including Bleuler, Jung, Freud, 
Pfänder, Scheler, Husserl, Ortega y Gasset and Heidegger. 
He directed the Sanatorium Bellevue from 1911 to 1956. 
A collection of writings dated 1920-1936, which is deeply 
infl uenced by these cultural encounters, can be found in 
Per un’antropologia fenomenologica (Binswanger, 1970). 
Binwanger’s analysis starts from the human presence as 
“Being-in-the-world”, without any prior distinction be-
tween “healthiness” and “madness”. The alien person is 
not one who lives “out of this world” but that human be-
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